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BANKRUPTCY: IN THE SHADOW OF MARATHON-CASE
LAW DEVELOPMENTS UNDER THE BANKRUPTCY
REFORM ACT OF 1978
SUE J. HODGES* and HALYNA M. TRAVERSA**
During the 1982-83 term, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit developed new case law under the Bankruptcy Re-
form Act of 1978.' Construing the new Reform Act (the "Code") has
not always changed prior law developed under the earlier Bankruptcy
Act of 1898 (the "Act"). 2 This article will review Seventh Circuit deci-
sions under the Code involving issues of involuntary petitions, standing
to appeal from an order, objections and exceptions to discharge, auto-
matic stay litigation, trustee's fees, and administrative expenses.
INVOLUNTARY PETITIONS-IN RE RASSI
The Seventh Circuit, in In re Rassi,3 further delineated the law
surrounding the involuntary petition. Section 303(b) of the Code4 pro-
vides that three or more entities must join an involuntary petition.-
However, if there are fewer than twelve creditors, any one creditor who
holds at least $5000 in non-voidable claims may file an involuntary
petition.6 The requirements generally make it much easier for a credi-
tor to file an involuntary petition under the Code than it was under the
A.B., U.C.L.A., 1972; J.D., IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 1984
** B.S., Loyola University of Chicago, 1966; M.A., University of Illinois, 1968; J.D., IIT
Chicago-Kent College of Law, 1984.
1. 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-151326 (Supp. 11 1978).
2. Ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544 (1898).
3. 701 F.2d 627 (7th Cir. 1983).
4. Sections 303(b)(1) and (2) provide:
(b) An involuntary case is commenced by the filing with the bankruptcy court of a
petition under chapter 7 or I I of this title-
(1) by three or more entities, each of which is either a holder of a claim
against such person that is not contingent as to liability or an indenture trustee rep-
resenting such a holder, if such claims aggregate at least $5,000 more than the value
of any lien on property of the debtor securing such claims held by the holders of
such claims;
(2) if there are fewer than 12 such holders, excluding any employee or insider
of such person and any transferee of a transfer that is voidable under section 544,
545, 547, 548, 549, or 724(a) of this title, by one or more of such holders that hold in
the aggregate at least $5,000 of such claims.
II U.S.C. §§ 303(b)(l)-(2) (1982).
5. 11 U.S.C. § 303(b)(1) (1982).
6. 11 U.S.C. § 303(b)(2) (1982). See also 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 303.08 (15th ed.
1984).
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Act. 7
In the Rassi proceedings below, Jefferson Bank, a secured creditor,
filed a petion for involuntary bankruptcy against the Rassis. The Ras-
sis moved to dismiss that petition on the grounds that they had more
than twelve creditors, thus requiring at least three creditors joining the
involuntary petition. Pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 104(e), 8 the Rassis
presented a list containing the names and addresses of all creditors and
the nature and amount of each claim. At the hearing on the motion to
dismiss, the bank moved for discovery and suggested that small, insig-
nificant creditors should be excluded from the list. The bankruptcy
court denied the bank's discovery motion and dismissed its involuntary
petition.
On appeal, the first issue addressed by the Seventh Circuit was
whether a creditor is entitled to discovery and a hearing to determine
the accuracy of the list of creditors provided by the debtor. The Sev-
enth Circuit resolved this issue in favor of the creditor, holding that the
bankruptcy court abused its discretion in denying the bank all opportu-
nity to determine which creditors should be excluded from the 303(b)
(2) count.9 The Code provides that fewer than three creditors can bring
an involuntary petition only if the debtor has fewer than twelve credi-
tors.10 Additionally, some creditors are statutorily excluded from this
number on the rationale that they would be unlikely to join an involun-
tary petition. I" Whenever fewer than three creditors file an involuntary
petition, the debtor may answer that there are more than twelve credi-
7. Acts of bankruptcy, a requirement under the former Act, are no longer required under
the Code. Additionally, balance sheet insolvency is no longer required in order for creditors to
bring an involuntary petition. Rather, the equity insolvency test is now used. That test asks
whether a debtor has the ability to pay his obligations as they fall due. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess. 323 (1977).
8. The procedural aspects of bankruptcy practice are governed by the Bankruptcy Rules of
Procedure. Rule 104(e) provided:
(e) Creditors other than the original petitioners may join in an involuntary petition at
any time before its dismissal. If the answer to an involuntary petition filed by one or 2
creditors avers the existence of 12 or more creditors, the alleged bankrupt shall file with
the answer a list of all his creditors with their addresses, a brief statement of the nature of
their claims, and the amounts thereof. If it appears that there are 12 or more creditors as
counted under section 95(e) of this title [303(b) of the present Code], the court shall
thereupon afford a reasonable opportunity for other creditors to join in the petition
before a hearing is held thereon.
RULES BANKR. PROC. Rule 104(e).
9. 701 F.2d at 631.
10. See supra note 4.
1I. The exceptions include employees of the debtor who might have an interest in the contin-
uing operation of the business; "insiders", such as relatives of the debtor; and creditors who have
received a voidable transfer. In short, those creditors who might be friendly with the debtor are
excluded from the count. 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY I 303.08[121[a] (15th ed. 1984).
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tors and file a supporting list. 12 According to the rules, that list must
include all creditors, but need not list those who should be statutorily
exempt from the count.'
3
The court's decision on the issue of discovery was carefully cir-
cumscribed. The court explicitly stated that it did not reach the ques-
tion of whether due process mandates an evidentiary hearing in all
cases. The court noted that the bankruptcy court did have some discre-
tion in the matter. However, the Seventh Circuit emphasized that the
bankruptcy court should not have ruled that the Rule 104 list was suffi-
cient to allow the bank to locate other creditors to join the petition.
According to the Seventh Circuit, the bankruptcy court should not
have summarily denied the bank all discovery. ' 4 Thus, the Rassi deci-
sion does not remove sound discretion to deny discovery if that discov-
ery is unwarranted; it does, however, mandate discovery adequate to
permit the petitioning creditor to determine whether another creditor is
statutorily exempt.
The second issue the Seventh Circuit addressed in Rassi was
whether small, recurring creditors should be excluded from the section
303 count. ' 5 The court declined to fashion a judicially created excep-
tion where none was explicitly set forth in the statute.' 6 The court
noted that an exception might be sensible in order to further the goals
of the Code, 17 but opined that since Congress had provided certain
statutory exclusions, the court had no authority to fashion others.'
8
That decision is, perhaps, subject to attack on policy grounds. Re-
fusal to judicially create a de minimis exception which a minority of
courts have in fact created 19 may deny relief to a major creditor simply
12. See supra note 8 for the text of the rule setting forth the procedure.
13. Id.
14. 701 F.2d at 631. "We hold that the bankruptcy court abused its discretion in denying the
bank all opportunity to determine which creditors should be excluded from the 303(b)(2) count."
15. 701 F.2d at 631.
16. Id at 632.
17. Under the old Act, the Fifth Circuit created a judicial exception. Eg., Denham v.
Shellman Grain Elevator, Inc., 444 F.2d 1376, 1378-79 (5th Cir. 1971). Contrarily, the Eighth and
Ninth Circuits have not recognized the de minimis exception. In re Okamoto, 491 F.2d 496, 497-98
(9th Cir. 1974); Theis v. Luther, 151 F.2d 397, 398 (8th Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 327 U.S. 781 (1946).
Apparently, the Seventh Circuit noted the correct distinction. That distinction is whether the
debtor deliberately accumulated a large number of small debts. 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY
303.08[12][d] (15th ed. 1984). Thus, the correct result was reached in the present case without
adding to the confusion and split of authority which occurred under the Act.
18. 701 F.2d at 632.
19. For further cases which exemplify de minimis exceptions see Security Bank and Trust Co.
v. Tarlton, 294 F. 698 (W.D. Tenn. 1923); In re Branche, 275 F. 555 (N.D.N.Y. 1921); In re Burg,
245 F. 173 (N.D. Tex. 1917); In re Blount, 142 F. 263 (E.D. Ark. 1906); In re Blaine Richards &
Co., 10 Bankr. 424 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1981). The "counting creditors" controversy is an area
which created a problem under the Act, which was not addressed by the draftsmen of the Code.
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because many other creditors had very small claims. Courts have also
noted that holders of these small recurring claims would be unlikely to
join an involuntary petition for reasons which parallel those underlying
the statutory exclusions. Perhaps the strongest reason is that the recur-
ring nature of the claims strongly encourages payment.
In a typical situation involving a recurring debt, a debtor needs the
goods or services provided. He cannot afford to have the creditor re-
fuse to deal with him further because of non-payment. The Rassi deci-
sion may have been tempered, however, by the fact that had there been
any showing that the debtors purposely incurred large numbers of
small claims in order to frustrate the purpose of the Code, the court
would have reached a different result. Thus, in Rassi, the Seventh Cir-
cuit declined to create a judicial exception to the statute while avoiding
an undesirable result in the case before it.
STANDING TO APPEAL-IN RE CARBIDE CUTOFF, INC.
In In re Carbide Cutoff Inc.,20 the Seventh Circuit addressed the
issue of whether a court-appointed special counsel2' had standing to
appeal from an order of the bankruptcy court. The applicable section
of the Code is silent on the issue of precisely who has standing to ap-
peal, whereas the Act explicitly limits appeals to a "person ag-
grieved." 22 In Carbide Cutoff, the problem arose because the district
20. 703 F.2d 259 (7th Cir. 1983).
21. Special counsel refers to a law firm or individual attorney appointed by the bankruptcy
court to litigate certain claims on behalf of the trustee. One problem in Carbide Cutoff was that
the scope of the special counsel's authority had not been set forth in the order of the bankruptcy
court. That order provided in pertinent part:
IT IS ORDERED:
That said Craig McGuire, as trustee of the estate of Carbide Cutoff, Inc., is
hereby authorized to employ as counsel LICHTSINN, HAENSEL, BASTIAN, &
ERCHUL, S.C.. . . for the purposes of commencing an action to secure the turnover
of certain assets transferred by the debtor corporation on or about the 19th day of
March, 1980, and for the further purpose of defending an action for declaratory
judgment commenced against said Craig McGuire...
Id at 262 n. 7.
22. Section 39(c) of the Act provided:
A person aggrieved by an order of a referee may, within ten days after the entry
thereof or within such extended time as the court upon petition filed within such ten-day
period may for cause shown allow, file with the referee a petition for review of such
order by a judge and serve a copy of such petition upon the adverse parties who were
represented at the hearing. Such petition shall set forth the order complained of and the
alleged errors in respect thereto. Unless the person aggreived shall petition for review of
such order within such ten-day period, or any extension thereof, the order of the referee
shall become final. Upon application of any party in interest, the execution or enforce-
ment of the order complained of may be suspended by the court upon such terms as will
protect the rights of all parties in interest.
II U.S.C. § 67(c) (1976); see I COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY I 3.03[6][a1[i] (15th ed. 1984).
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court simply applied the general rule that the trustee is the appropriate
party to appeal on behalf of unsecured creditors.23 Upon review, the
Seventh Circuit found that the facts of Carbide Cutoff might present a
situation in which that general rule is inapposite. Consequently, the
Seventh Circuit reversed the district court decision and remanded the
matter to the district court with instructions to further remand it to the
bankruptcy court.
Even prior to the beginning of any proceedings in bankruptcy,
Carbide Cutoff had experienced severe financial difficulties. It there-
fore arranged, in early 1980, for its principal creditors to receive addi-
tional security for an outstanding loan.24 Additionally, Carbide Cutoff
arranged for the sale of its assets to Alpha Sierra Corporation in ex-
change for Alpha Sierra's assumption of Carbide's indebtedness to the
bank. On February 27, 1980, Carbide sent a bulk sale notice25 to its
23. That rule is set forth in the Seventh Circuit case of In re Tyne, 261 F.2d 249 (7th Cir.
1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 974 (1959).
24. After Carbide began experiencing financial difficulties, the bank received a junior mort-
gage on certain real estate. Subsequently, it received a security interest in Carbide's blade sharp-
ening facilities in Texas and Pennsylvania. 703 F.2d at 261 n. 1.
25. A bulk sales notice is required to protect the rights of subsequent purchasers vis-a-vis a
transferor's creditors whenever a bulk sale as defined by the Uniform Commercial Code is ef-
fected.
Article 6, section 102 defines bulk transfer, providing:
(1) A "bulk transfer" is any transfer in bulk and not in the ordinary course of the
transferor's business of a major part of the materials, supplies, merchandise or other
inventory (Section 9-109) of an enterprise subject to this Article.
(2) A transfer of a substantial part of the equipment (Section 9-109) of such an
enterprise is a bulk transfer if it is made in connection with a bulk transfer of inventory,
but not otherwise.
(3) The enterprises subject to this Article are all those whose principal business is
the sale of merchandise from stock, including those who manufacture what they sell.
(4) Except as limited by the following section all bulk transfers of goods located
within this State are subject to this Article.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 26, § 6-102 (1977).
Moreover, section 6-105 provides for notice to creditors:
In addition to the requirements of the preceding section, any bulk transfer subject to
this Article except one made by auction sale (Section 6-107) is ineffective against any
creditor of the transferor unless at least 10 days before he takes possession of the goods
or pays for them, whichever happens first, the transferee gives notice of the transfer in
the manner and to the persons hereafter provided (Section 6-106).
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 26, § 6-105 (1977).
Section 6-106 sets forth the requirements of the notice:
(1) The notice to creditors shall state:
(a) that a bulk transfer is about to be made; and
(b) the names and business addresses of the transferor and transferee, and all
other business names and addresses used by the transferor within 3 years last past so
far as known to the transferee; and
(c) whether or not all the debts of the transferor are to be paid in full as they
fall due as a result of the transaction, and if so, the address to which creditors should
send their bills.
(2) If the debts of the transferor are not to be paid in full as they fall due or if the
transferee is in doubt on that point then the notice shall state further:
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creditors, announcing the impending sale of assets to Alpha Sierra. On
March 7, 1980, before that sale was consummated, an unsecured credi-
tor filed an involuntary petition against Carbide. The creditor initially
obtained a temporary restraining order blocking the sale. However,
upon expiration of the order, the sale was completed. On April 4, 1980,
the bankruptcy court adjudged Carbide Cutoff insolvent. The Chapter
VII proceedings continued, although Carbide had been stripped of its
principal assets. The trustee appointed by the bankruptcy court made
no attempt to pursue the estate's claims against the bank and Alpha
Sierra, 26 and took no measures to collect Carbide's assets. Instead, he
applied to compromise 27 the estate's claims against the bank and Alpha
(a) the location and general description of the property to be transferred and
the estimated total of the transferor's debts;
(b) the address where the schedule of property and list of creditors may be
inspected;
(c) whether the transfer is to pay existing debts and if so the amount of such
debts and to whom owing;
(d) whether the transfer is for new consideration and if so the amount of such
consideration and the time and place of payment.
(3) The notice in any case shall be delivered personally or sent by registered or
certified mail to all the persons shown on the list of creditors furnished by the transferor
(Section 6-104) and to all other persons who are known to the transferee to hold or
assert claims against the transferor.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 26, § 6-106 (1977).
26. For example, the trustee, on behalf of the secured creditors, had a colorable claim to set
aside the preferential security interest granted to the bank.
27. Section 547(b) of the Code covers preferences and provides:
(b) Except as provided in subsection (c) of this section, the trustee may avoid any
transfer of property of the debtor-
(1) to or for the benefit of a creditor;
(2) for or on account of an antecedent debt owed by the debtor before such
transfer was made;
(3) made while the debtor was insolvent;
(4) made-
(A) on or within 90 days before the date of the filing of the petition; or
(B) between 90 days and one year before the date of the filing of the
petition; if such creditor, at the time of such transfer-
(i) was an insider; and
(ii) had reasonable cause to believe the debtor was insolvent at the
time of such transfer; and
(5) that enables such creditor to receive more than such creditor would re-
ceive if-
(A) the case were a case under chapter 7 of this title;
(B) the transfer had not been made; and
(C) such creditor received payment of such debt to the extent provided
by the provisions of this title.
II U.S.C. § 547(b) (1982).
Additionally, the trustee was urged to avoid the sale of goods to Alpha-Sierra as an unauthor-
ized post petition transfer, which is governed by section 549 of the Code:
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) and (c) of this section, the trustee may
avoid a transfer of property of the estate-
(1) that occurs after the commencement of the case; and
(2)(A) that is authorized under section 303(f) or 542(c) of this title; or
(B) that is not authorized under this title or by the court.
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Sierra. However, that application was later withdrawn. Alpha Sierra
filed a declaratory judgment action seeking a ruling that the sale of
assets was valid. In response to that complaint, the trustee improperly
admitted numerous allegations of that complaint. Subsequently, the
trustee sought again to compromise the claims.
That attempt prompted a group of unsecured creditors to seek re-
moval of the trustee 28 or appointment of a special counsel to pursue in
the trustee's name the estate's claims against the bank and Alpha Si-
erra. The second application to compromise the claims was denied and
special counsel was employed by agreement. Upon the bank's and Al-
pha Sierra's motion for reconsideration, the bankruptcy court granted
the application to compromise the claim over the objection of the un-
secured creditors. The special counsel then appealed to the district
court. The district court declined to reach the merits of the matter and
dismissed the appeal on the grounds that the special counsel lacked
standing to appeal. The court determined that the special counsel de-
rived his authority solely through the trustee and so, upon entry of the
compromise order, the trustee had actually received all relief requested.
The special counsel appealed the district court's holding to the Seventh
Circuit.
It was evident to the Seventh Circuit that the problem lay in the
bankruptcy court's failure to clarify the scope of the special counsel's
(b) In an involuntary case, a transfer that occurs after the commencement of such
case but before the order for relief is valid against the trustee to the extent of any value,
including services, but not including satisfaction or securing of a debt that arose before
the commencement of the case, given after the commencement of the case in exchange
for such transfer, notwithstanding any notice or knowledge of the case that the transferee
has.
(c) The trustee may not avoid under subsection (a) of this section a transfer, to a
good faith purchaser without knowledge of the commencement of the case and for pres-
ent fair equivalent value or to a purchaser at a judicial sale, of real property located
other than in the county in which the case is commenced, unless a copy of the petition
was filed in the office where conveyances of real property in such county are recorded
before such transfer was so far perfected that a bona fide purchaser of such property
against whom applicable law permits such transfer to be perfected cannot acquire an
interest that is superior to the interest of such good faith or judicial sale purchaser. A
good faith purchaser, without knowledge of the commencement of the case and for less
than present fair equivalent value, of real property located other than in the county in
which the case is commenced, under a transfer that the trustee may avoid under this
section, has a lien on the property transferred to the extent of any present value given,
unless a copy of the petition was so filed before such transfer was so perfected.
(d) An action or proceeding under this section may not be commenced after the
earlier of-
(1) two years after the date of the transfer sought to be avoided; and
(2) the time the case is closed or dismissed.
Il U.S.C. § 549 (1982).
28. See I I U.S.C. § 324 (1982) which provides that "[t]he court, after notice and a hearing,
may remove a trustee or an examiner, for cause."
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authority. Noting that the Seventh Circuit rule generally precluded
anyone but the trustee from bringing an appeal,29 the court determined
that the instant case might be one in which the general rule should not
apply. Whether or not standing was proper depended upon the scope
of the general counsel's authority. If the appointment was merely to
assist the trustee, standing would be improper. If, however, the pur-
pose of the appointment was to protect the estate from the trustee's lack
of diligence in pursuing certain claims on behalf of the estate, then
standing to appeal should lie.
In its discussion regarding possible reasons for declining to apply
the general rule, the Seventh Circuit first noted that the Act limited
appeals to "persons aggrieved", while the Code is silent on the issue.
30
Noting in the situation before it that considerations under the Act were
still appropriate, and that the special counsel actually represented a
"person aggrieved", the Seventh Circuit opined that if the bankruptcy
court found the authority of the special counsel broad enough to pur-
sue claims on behalf of the general creditors, then his standing to ap-
peal should be upheld.
In reversing the Carbide Cutoffdistrict court's mechanical applica-
tion of the general rule, the court has shown sensitivity to policies un-
derlying the Code. As in Rassi, the court recognized the need to
balance the equitable principles underlying the Code with the accepted
rules of statutory interpretation, and with concerns of orderly adminis-
tration of the bankrupt estate.
Arguably, the Seventh Circuit should have reached its result by a
less circuitous route, interpreting the omission under the Code to be
purposeful so that anyone could appeal from an order of the bank-
ruptcy court. This is not, however, the approach recommended by
commentators. 31 Additionally, to have adopted such a course would
mitigate against the policies of curtailing the flood of litigation and of
orderly administration of the bankrupt estate. Therefore, it appears
that Carbide Cutoff was correctly decided, and that the decision gave
proper consideration to relevant policies.
29. The district court simply found that the rule announced in In re Tyne governed the case
before it. 703 F.2d at 264.
30. See supra note 22.
31. See 1 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 3.03[6][a][i] (15th ed. 1984). The reason for the sug-
gestion is to limit appeals from bankruptcy orders to persons directly affected by those orders. See
Hartman Corp. of America v. United States, 304 F.2d 429, 431 (8th Cir. 1962).
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DISCHARGEABILITY-IN RE MARTIN AND IN RE KREPS
In In re Martin,32 the Seventh Circuit reviewed a direct appeal 33
arising from bankruptcy proceedings in which objections were filed
seeking a denial of discharge because of an alleged concealment of as-
sets. A discharge grants the debtor a legal right not to pay his debts.
34
In a "straight" bankruptcy proceeding under Chapter 7, the matter of a
discharge is dealt with in a two-step process. First, the court deter-
mines whether the debtor will receive a discharge. 35 Once the court has
determined that no objection to discharge exists, it ascertains whether
there are claims against the debtor which are excepted from dish-
carge.36 The concept of the total discharge is the "heart of the fresh
start provisions of the bankruptcy law."
'37
Most of the objections which will support a denial of discharge are
premised upon the dishonesty or lack of cooperation of the debtor.
38
32. 698 F.2d 883 (7th Cir. 1983).
33. Direct appeal from an order of the bankruptcy court to the court of appeals is permitted
if the parties to the appeal so agree. 28 U.S.C. § 1293(b) (1982).
34. When an objection to discharge is made, a hearing is held to determine the validity of the
objection. BANKR. RULE 703. If the court finds that the debtor is not entitled to a discharge, the
debtor will owe his debts to the extent that they have not been paid through a distribution of the
debtor's assets. During the pendency of his case, a debtor is protected from his creditors through
the automatic stay. Upon the disposition of a case, the stay is lifted, I I U.S.C. § 362 (c)(2)(A)
(1982), and the creditors may proceed with their collection efforts.
35. 11 U.S.C. § 727(a) (1982). The court is required to grant the debtor a discharge unless
one of the ten conditions listed in subsections (a)(1) through (a)(10) of section 727 is present.
Conversely, the debtor is denied a discharge if any of those conditions is present.
36. 1I U.S.C. § 727(b) (1982) provides that, if there are no objections to discharge, then all of
the debtor's debts are discharged except for those debts specifically excepted under § 523. Subsec-
tion (a)(l) through (a)(9) list the individual types of claims from which a discharge will not be
granted. Creditors with non-dischargeable claims can then proceed against the debtor's property
after the close of the case, and the termination of the automatic stay. I I U.S.C. § 362 (c)(2)(A).
See supra note 34.
37. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 384 (1977); S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong. 2d Sess.
98 (1978). The practitioner needs to carefully distinguish between such issues as may raise an
objection to discharge under § 727 as opposed to those issues which concern exception to dis-
charge under section 523. "A successful objection to a chapter 7 discharge creates a situation in
which the debtor's assets are liquidated without significant, corresponding benefits. . . If an ob-
jection is successfully raised, no debts are discharged. Conversely, issues raised under section 523
relate to the dischargeability of individual debts. An exception to dischargeability removes the
individual debt from the discharge order, but all other debts are, nevertheless, discharged". Mor-
ton, I BANKRUPTCY LAW AND PRACTICE § 27.13, at 24 (1981).
38. 11 U.S.C. § 727 (1982) provides:
(a) The court shall grant the debtor a discharge, unless-
(1) the debtor is not an individual;
(2) the debtor, with intent to hinder, delay, or defraud a creditor or an officer
of the estate charged with custody of property under this title, has transferred, re-
moved, destroyed, mutilated, or concealed, or has permitted to be transferred, re-
moved, destroyed, mutilated, or concealed-
(A) property of the debtor, within one year before the date of the filing of
the petition; or
(B) property of the estate, after the date of the filing of the petition;
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Since the discharge is to have a constructive rehabilitative function, it
cannot be granted to debtors who are unwilling to wipe the slate clean.
Thus, while the changes implemented by the Code have not been
sweeping,39 the question of discharge is of prime importance in bank-
(3) the debtor has concealed, destroyed, mutilated, falsified, or failed to keep
or preserve any recorded information, including books, documents, records, and pa-
pers, from which the debtor's financial condition or business transactions might be
ascertained, unless such act or failure to act was justified under all of the circum-
stances of the case;
(4) the debtor knowingly and fraudulently, in or in connection with the
case-
(A) made a false oath or account;
(B) presented or used a false claim;
(C) gave, offered, received, or attempted to obtain money, property, or
advantage, or a promise of money, property, or advantage, for acting or for-
bearing to act; or
(D) withheld from an officer of the estate entitled to possession under
this title, any recorded information, including books, documents, records, and
papers, relating to the debtor's property or financial affairs;
(5) the debtor has failed to explain satisfactorily, before determination of de-
nial of discharge under this paragraph, any loss of assets or deficiency of assets to
meet the debtor's liabilities;
(6) the debtor has refused, in the case-. (A) to obey any lawful order of the court, other than an order to respond
to a material question or to testify;
(B) on the ground of privilege against self-incrimination, to respond to a
material question approved by the court or to testify, after the debtor has been
granted immunity with respect to the matter concerning which such privilege
was invoked; or
(C) on a ground other than the properly invoked privilege against self-
incrimination, to respond to a material question approved by the court or to
testify;
(7) the debtor has committed any act specified in paragraph (2), (3), (4), (5), or
(6) of this subsection, on or within one year before the date of the filing of the
petition, or during the case, in connection with another case concerning an insider;
(8) the debtor has been granted a discharge under this section, under section
1141 of this title, or under section 14,371 or 476 of the Bankruptcy Act, in a case
commenced within six years before the date of the filing of the petition;
(9) the debtor has been granted a discharge under section 1328 of this title, or
under section 660 or 661 of the Bankruptcy Act, in a case commenced within six
years before the date of the filing of the petition, unless payments under the plan in
such case totaled at least-
(A) 100 percent of the allowed unsecured claims in such case; or
(B)(i) 70 percent of such claims; and
(ii) the plan was proposed by the debtor in good faith, and was the
debtor's best effort.
39. Most exceptions to discharge listed in the Code parallel those allowed under the Act, but
the Code narrows the Act's total barriers to discharge, inasmuch as it permits the broadest possible
relief in a bankruptcy case. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. 309 (1977). Specifically, the
concept of provability, a central provision of the Act, has been abolished. Section 523 now re-
quires that for an exception to prevail, the reliance of the creditor on a false financial statement
must have been reasonable. That provision codifies case law construing section 17(a)(2) of the Act
of 1898. S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 78 (1978); S. REP. No. 598, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 77-
79 (1978). See infra notes 90 to 123 and accompanying text for review of In re Kreps and the
meaning of reasonable. Cases related to discharge which are considered in this article all stem
from chapter 7 proceedings. Chapter 13 requirements for discharge vary considerably in that a
section 1328(a) discharge does not provide for all of the exceptions from discharge that are set out
in section 523. Chapter 13 debors may also be granted a "hardship" discharge under section
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ruptcy law, whether in a straight bankruptcy proceeding under Chapter
7, or in a rehabilitation proceeding under Chapter 13.40
The largest creditor and the trustee of the estate, appellants in
Martin, contended that the debtor, Ronald Martin, had an interest in a
condominium occupied by the debtor, but asserted by him to be the
property of his father, Alex Martin. 4' As testified to during the trial,
the condominium was purchased in 1976 for $67,500, of which $15,000
was a cash down payment, and the balance from the proceeds of a
mortgage loan. The note on the mortgage loan was signed by both the
debtor's parents, and title was held by a Chicago bank under a land
trust with the debtor's father as beneficial owner. However, it was un-
disputed that the debtor lived in the condominium, paid all expenses
connected with it, including the mortgage, deducted the interest pay-
ments on his own federal income tax returns, and generally enjoyed the
benefits of ownership.
42
At the heart of the dispute was the ultimate source of the $15,000
down payment. While the debtor claimed that the funds used were
given to him by his father, a statement corroborated by the testimony
of the father, the appellants asserted that the funds were in fact Ron-
ald's. The appellants claimed there was a "secret" 43 agreement be-
tween Ronald and his father that the parents would hold the property
as nominees for their son.44 The bankruptcy court found there was no
credible proof that the debtor did not provide the $15,000 for the down
payment on the condominium.45 Neither was there a question of the
debtor's insolvency at the time of the purchase, since Ronald's income
was found at that time to be over $100,000 a year, while his father's
1328(b), but that discharge is not as comprehensive as that obtained under section 1328(a). A
"hardship" discharge is limited by all of the section 523(a) exceptions to discharge. 11 U.S.C.
§ 1328(c) (1982). Further discussion of chapter 13 discharge is not within the scope of this article.
40. Chapter 13 provides persons with a regular income an opportunity to reschedule the pay-
ment of their debts, rather than liquidating the estate and discharging the debtor as provided for
in Chapter 7. Chapter 13 plans are subject to court approval and must be proposed in good faith.
The repayment plans range from 10% to 100% of the amounts owed. After repayment according
to the plan, the debtor receives a discharge. I I U.S.C. §§ 1301-1307 (1982).
41. 698 F.2d at 885.
42. Id
43. In fact, no place in their brief do appellants explicitly state that a secret agreement ex-
isted. That may only be inferred from the allegations that the debtor and his father "attempte[d]
to conceal the true ownership of the condominium." Brief for Appellants, at 19, In re Martin, 698
F.2d 883 (7th Cir. 1983).
Appellants state that it was the bankruptcy court which specifically "suggested" "that a ..
possible explanation for [the concealment] was that there was a secret agreement between Alex
and Ronald for Alex to hold the property in a land trust as a nominee for Ronald." Id. at 885.
44. 698 F.2d at 885.
45. Id.
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income was only about $6,000 a year.4 6 In spite of these findings, the
bankruptcy court granted the debtor a discharge. Moreover, the dis-
charge was granted in spite of the fact that: "[s]eldom has this court
observed witnesses whose credibility was lower. It was not so much
that they appeared to be lying as it was that they seemed indifferent to
the truth.
47
The Seventh Circuit reiterated the well-established rule of law that
findings of fact made in a bankruptcy proceeding will be set aside only
if clearly erroneous.48 It observed further that due to a lack of docu-
mentary evidence, it has been necessary to reconstruct the relevant
events and transactions mostly from oral evidence.49 Consequently, the
Seventh Circuit found that the bankruptcy judge's assessment of the
debtor's credibility, which certainly was critical in this case, was not
replicable on appeal. The court agreed with the bankruptcy judge that
the source of the funds used to buy the condominium was indeed the
debtor's.
50
The Seventh Circuit determined, however, that the lower court
had erroneously interpreted the burden of proof requirements and that
there were "at least two independent gounds upon which a discharge
must be denied to the debtor."'S The court then reversed and re-
manded, noting that the case could be reopened for receipt of addi-
tional evidence at the discretion of the bankruptcy court.5 2
The two independent grounds for discharge relied upon by the
court were section 727(a)(5) of the Code which was cited as the primary
gound upon which to deny discharge, and section 727(a)(3). Section
727(a)(5) provides that a discharge shall be denied when "the debtor
has failed to explain satisfactorily, . . . any loss of assets or deficiency
of assets to meet the debtor's liabilities. ' 53 Noting that this section is
basically indistinguishable from section 14(c)(7) of the Act, the court
recognized that a discharge will be denied unless the debtor sufficiently
persuades the court of the debtor's good faith. The court cited cases
46. Id.
47. In re Martin, 13 Bankr. 883, 884 (Bankr. N.D. IUl. 1981).
48. BANK. RULE 810. Cases construing that rule have held that before a judge's order may
be reversed, the court must find that no testimony exists for the support of his order, or that he has
acted arbitrarily and capriciously. In re Knight, 421 F. Supp. 1387 (M.D. La. 1976), ajf'a 551
F.2d 862 (5th Cir. 1977); Wright v. Lubinko, 515 F.2d 260 (9th Cir. 1975); In re Dolnick, 374 F.
Supp. 84 (N.D. I11. 1974); Carini v. Matera, 592 F.2d 378 (7th Cir. 1979).
49. 698 F.2d at 885-86.
50. Id at 886.
51. Id.
52. 698 F.2d at 888.
53. I1 U.S.C. § 727(a)(5) (1982).
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decided under the Act and under the Code,54 and noted its broad
power to decline discharge when the bankrupt's explanation of loss or
disappearance of assets consisted of nothing more than ". . . a vague,
indefinite, and uncorroborated hodgepodge of financial transactions." 55
Expressing its displeasure at the fact that the debtor made virtually
no attempt to adequately pinpoint the source of the funds which facili-
tated his purchase, the court observed that the debtor had mistakenly
relied on the notion that the creditors had not made out a prima facie
case under their complaint. 56 However, the court concluded that the
creditors had indeed presented sufficient evidence to more than satisfy
their burden of proof under section 727(a)(5),5 7 and held that, given the
debtor's failure, in turn, to meet his burden of proof, the discharge
should not have been granted.
Such a finding was diametrically opposed to the finding of the
bankruptcy court. That court had established that a prima facie show-
ing of a secret agreement between the debtor and his father concerning
the ownership of the condominium, which would have satisfied the
creditor's burden of first going forward with the evidence, had not been
made. Thus, while there was no substantial credible evidence to rebut
a prima facie showing of an agreement, it was in any event unneces-
sary, for "the influence of a secret agreement [between the two was] no
stronger than the inference of a gift." 58
54. Baum v. Milliken, Inc., 359 F.2d 811 (7th Cir. 1966) (in which the court upheld the bank-
ruptcy referee's denial of a discharge on the basis that the debtor had failed to adequately explain
the shrinkage in his assets in the 21-month period prior to filing for bankruptcy); McBee v.
Sliman, 512 F.2d 504 (5th Cir. 1975) (fact that husband asserted lack of legal title to wife's monies,
which he allegedly took without her knowledge and lost in gambling spree, did not relieve him of
responsibility of accounting for those monies, and wife was therefore, denied discharge); In re
Kapsos, 16 Bankr. 280 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1981) (discharge denied on grounds that debtors had
deliberately concealed material items of property within one year before bankruptcy and after
filing of petition, had failed to explain satisfactorily loss of their assets); In re Emmett, 16 Bankr.
656 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1981) (transfer by debtor of all his property into his daughter's name prior to
declaration of bankruptcy is sufficient evidence for court to deny discharge based on transfers
made without consideration, with requisite intent to hinder, delay or defraud creditors of the
estate, with failure to keep or preserve recorded relevant information and failure to reveal exist-
ence of certain assets in his schedules).
55. 698 F.2d at 886, citing Baum v. Milliken, Inc., 359 F.2d at 814.
56. 698 F.2d at 886. The debtor had made almost no effort to explain the transaction in
question, even to the satisfaction of the bankruptcy court. In fact, he presented no evidence after
the creditors had put on their case in chief.
57. Id. The Seventh Circuit appeared to take the bankruptcy court to task for its seemingly
incongruous holding-on the one hand finding that the money used to purchase the condominium
was indeed Ronald Martin's, but speculating on the other hand in spite of Ronald Martin's persis-
tent declarations that he received the money from his father, that the condominium was possibly
intended as a gift from the younger Martin to his father.
58. In re Martin, 13 Bankr. 883, 886 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1981), rev., 698 F.2d 883 (7th Cir.
1983).
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The Seventh Circuit also looked to section 727(a)(3) as a second
independent ground on which to deny the discharge to the debtor.5 9
Under that section, discharge is denied when:
the debtor has concealed, destroyed, mutilated, falsified, or failed to
keep or preserve any recorded information, including books, docu-
ments, records, and papers, from which the debtor's financial condi-
tion or business transactions might be ascertained, unless such act or
failure to act was justified under all of the circumstances of the
case. 60
General principles underlying former section 14(c)(2) 61 of the Act
also apply to section 727(a)(3) of the Code.62 Bankruptcy courts have
long noted that the granting of a discharge is precluded in any case
where complete disclosure is lacking and the court doubts the debtor's
good faith. 63 While a court will employ the standard of what is reason-
able under the circumstances, 64 it will nevertheless require "that there
be available written evidence made and preserved from which the pres-
ent financial condition of the bankrupt, and his business transactions
for a reasonable period in the past may be ascertained. ' 65 Such records
are necessary in order to determine the accuracy of the debtor's status
as he portrays it to the court.66 The Seventh Circuit had already recog-
nized in passing that there was a lack of documentary evidence outside
the courtroom with which to support a finding as to the source of the
funds used for the down payment on the condominium. 67 It is pre-
cisely such a lack of documentation or absence of recordkeeping which
amounts to the failure to which section 727(a)(3) applies.68
However, under the Act, all cases decided under section 14(c)(2)
specifically referred to the conditions of recordkeeping imposed by that
section.69 The Seventh Circuit failed to discuss these requirements, and
described the grounds controlling the denial of a discharge under sec-
59. 698 F.2d at 887.
60. I1 U.S.C. § 727(a)(3) (1982).
61. See Matter of Underhill, 82 F.2d 258 (2d Cir. 1936).
62. 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 727.03[3] (15th ed. 1984).
63. In re Underhill, 82 F.2d 258, 260 (2d Cir. 1936).
64. Id. at 260.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. 698 F.2d at 886.
68. COHEN, BANKRUPTCY, SECURED TRANSACTIONS AND OTHER DEBTOR-CREDITOR MAT-
TERS at 189 (1981).
69. There have, at the time of writing, been no cases decided by other circuits in which a
denial of discharge was considered under section 727(a)(3). For a discussion of cases decided
under the Act involving a denial of discharge due to a failure to keep or preserve books or records,
see 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 727.03[3] (15th ed. 1984).
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tion 727(a)(3) as simply "a continuing concealment of assets."' 70 This
appears to be a departure from the gounds for discharge under that
section, inasmuch as the legislature clearly intended to retain the re-
quirements related to bookkeeping originally specified under the Act.
71
Indeed, mere continuing concealment of assets as an objection to dis-
charge which the Seventh Circuit here has ascribed to subsection (a)(3),
falls within section 727(a)(2) 72 of the Code. Although the principal ele-
ment under section 727(a)(2) is that the debtor's fraudulent transfer or
concealment of assets occur within one year before the date of the filing
of the petition,73 some courts found the corresponding section under
the Act controlling when it was shown that although the Act com-
plained of was done prior to the statutory period, it in effect operated as
a continuing concealment.
74
No justification is given by the Seventh Circuit for its failure to
articulate the requirements of section 727(a)(3). 75 Conceivably, the
court could have applied the reasoning of In re Groth,76 which in dicta
supported the concept that a concealment which would prevent dis-
charge may occur more than one year prior to the declaration of
bankruptcy.
Without making any reference to the debtor's failure to comply
with section 727(a)(3)'s recordkeeping requirements, the Seventh Cir-
cuit found that section applicable in Martin strictly on the basis of a
continuing concealment of assets. As with the first ground, the Seventh
Circuit found it appropriate to analyze the application of this section in
terms of the burden of proof requirements provided for in Bankruptcy
70. 698 F.2d at 887.
71. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. 384 (1977); S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess.
98 (1978).
72. 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(2) (1982).
73. Id.
74. In re Groth, 36 F.2d 41 (7th Cir. 1929). In Groth, the court considered whether there had
been an intent to conceal assets and defraud creditors. The debtor had sold his personal property
and purchasing interest in his home, but continued to occupy it with his family as a homestead for
over a year before filing a voluntary petition. The court stated:
much stress was laid upon the fact that the acts complained of occurred more than a year
prior to the date of bankruptcy proceedings. But if these acts had as their purpose the
concealment of assets of the [debtor], which concealment continued during the period
when these proceedings in bankruptcy were contemplated, the lapse of a year would not
prevent such concealment from coming within the condemnation of the statute.
Id. at 42.
75. The court referred to the fact that appellants themselves sought a denial of discharge
under § 727(a)(3), "the claim most strongly pressed by the appellants [in that] the purchase, and
subsequent ownership status of the condominium constituted such a continuing concealment of
the debtor's assets." 698 F.2d at 887.
76. See supra note 74.
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Rule 407. 77 Repeating its rejection of the lower court's burden of proof
analysis, the Seventh Circuit merely served to confuse the issue further
by discussing the burden of proof requirements in general terms, with-
out specifically relating them to section 727(a)(3). The court's analysis
thus lacked a suitable explanation of why it did not find it necessary to
question in particular whether there had been a disappearance or con-
cealment of records or books relating to the debtor's assets. Specifi-
cally, the court found that the creditors had satisfied their burden of
first going forward with the evidence by proving "a transfer of funds by
the debtor, with a continuous subsequent use by the debtor of the prop-
erty acquired with [those] funds. ' 78 Consequently, "the burden there-
after of producing additional evidence was shifted to the debtor.
'79
Nowhere, however, does the Seventh Circuit mention the section
727(a)(3) requirement that the creditor prove the debtor had "de-
stroyed, mutilated, falsified, or failed to keep or preserve any recorded
information. . .from which the debtor's financial condition. . .might
be ascertained." 80 The court found instead that since the burden of
coming forward with additional evidence had shifted to the debtor, the
debtor was obliged to provide "an explanation of his actions."' 8' The
court found that such an explanation, geared solely towards a transfer
of funds and continuous use of the concealed property, would be a suf-
ficient explanation under section 727(a)(3).a2 However, the issues of
fund transfers and concealment of assets are more properly objected to
under section 727(a)(2).
During the 82-83 term, the Seventh Circuit displayed its sensitivity
77. Rule 407 provides that "[alt the trial on a complaint objecting to a discharge, the plaintiff
has the burden of proving the facts essential to his objection." However, if it appears that the
debtor is more likely to have access to evidence tending to prove certain facts, then the court may
impose upon the debtor the burden of going forward with evidence relating to those facts. See
Notes of Advisory Committee on Rules, Bankr. Rule 407. Initially, however, the plaintiff is re-
quired to go beyond a mere showing of "reasonable grounds," as had been previously required
prior to the enactment of Rule 407, when the burden of proof as to specific actions of objection
had been governed by section 14(c) of the Act. Under Rule 407, the plaintiff must "adduce proof
of the facts which will establish that the debtor has committed the act charged before the burden
of going forward with the evidence will shift to the debtor. The debtor can meet the burden either
by disproving the act charged or, by resort to justification clause in section 727(a)(3), the debtor
could satisfy the court that the actions or failure established by the plaintiff were justified under all
the circumstances of the case." 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTrcY 727.03[41, at 727-45 (15th ed. 1984).
78. 698 F.2d at 887.
79. Id.
80. il U.S.C. § 727 (a)(3) (1982).
81. 698 F.2d at 888.
82. Despite their failure to keep records, the appellants were able to reconstruct, with appar-
ent accuracy, the transfer of all those funds in order to prove to the Seventh Circuit's satisfaction
the debtor's interest in the condominium. Brief for Appellant, In re Martin, at 8-12.
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to the policy issues underlying the Code in Rassi and Carbide Cutoff83
Conversely, this sensitivity is lacking in Martin. Perhaps the court's
seeming indifference to the finer points of distinction within section 727
is explained by the court's statement that "[ilt is clearly unsatisfactory
to grant the debtor a discharge in a case such as this, where the debtor
'stonewalls' the creditor and refuses to credibly explain to the court his
puzzling or suspect transactions.
'84
The court equated the failure of the debtor to come forward with
an explanation of his actions, once the burden of going forward with
the evidence had shifted upon his shoulders, with the requirement of
recordkeeping enumerated under section 727(a)(3). Unfortunately, the
court did not expressly note that it was making that connection, or for
that matter, define where the connection was between section 727(a)(3)
and a mere continuing concealment of assets.
The Seventh Circuit's analysis is thus not specifically articulated in
the concrete terms of section 727(a)(3); it would appear that the court
expects the section to be read between the lines in order to support a
denial of discharge.
The Seventh Circuit also considered cases arising under section
523(a)(2), 85 which enumerates debts not included in section 727(a)'s
general grant of discharge.
In In re Kreps,86 the court resolved whether reasonable reliance is
to be interpreted under section 523(a)(2)(B) 87 of the Code in the same
way the courts interpreted reasonable reliance under section 17(a)(2) of
the Act. 88 Section 523(a)(2)(B) precludes the discharge of any debt in-
curred through the use of a materially false written statement about the
debtor's financial condition, on which the creditor has reasonably re-
lied, and which was made by the debtor with an intent to deceive.8 9
The element of reasonableness as a factor in establishing reliance by
the debtor constitutes the principal difference between the correspond-
ing sections under the Act and the Code. Section 17(a)(2) required
only a showing of reliance in fact and precluded discharge of debts
incurred through "a renewal of credit in reliance upon a materially
false statement in writing respecting [a debtor's] financial condition
83. See supra notes 3-31 and accompanying text.
84. 698 F.2d at 888.
85. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2) (1982).
86. 700 F.2d 372 (7th Cir. 1983).
87. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(B) (1982).
88. 11 U.S.C. § 35(a)(2) (1976).
89. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(B) (1982).
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made with. . .intent to deceive.. ."90 Later development of case law,
however, ostensibly established a requirement of reasonable reliance. 9'
Thus, the inclusion of reasonableness as a criterion for reliance under
section 523(a)(2)(B)(iii) explicitly reflected congressional intent to cod-
ify "case law construing [section 17(a)(2)]. ' '92
In re Kreps was heard on appeal from a judgment of the district
court, which had affirmed a bankruptcy court order granting a dis-
charge to the debtors, Orrin and Margaret Kreps. It was the Seventh
Circuit's first opportunity to interpret section 523(a)(2)(B)(iii) of the
Code.93 The creditor, First National Bank of Lansing, had objected to
the discharge. Kreps and the bank had had a lending relationship for
fifteen years.94 At all times, Kreps had dealt directly with the bank's
president, Gilbert J. Rynberk.95 While earlier loans were made for
Kreps' home construction business, the loan at issue involved a 90-day
$32,000 unsecured personal loan to Kreps.96 When the note for this
loan came due, Kreps sought and received a renewal of the loan. On a
second 90-day renewal, Rynberk prepared, and Kreps signed, a list of
Kreps' assets. It was undisputed at trial that this statement contained
materially false information.97 Shortly after the bank had renewed the
loan a second time, Kreps filed a petition for bankruptcy. 98
The bankruptcy court found that, while the written statement con-
cerning Kreps' financial condition signed by Kreps for the purpose of
obtaining the second renewal was materially false and was made with
an intent to deceive, the First National Bank had not relied upon the
statement in renewing the loan.99 Rather, the court found that the re-
90. In re Garman, 625 F.2d 755, 761 (7th Cir. 1980), republished at 693 F.2d 1252 (7th Cir.
1980), to accurately reflect the representation of counsel.
91. Id at 759. See also In re Matera, 592 F.2d 378 (7th Cir. 1979) (for a debt to be nondis-
chargeable in bankruptcy on the ground that it was induced by false representations, it must be
found that the creditor actually relied upon the representation and that such reliance was reason-
able); In re Knight, 421 F. Supp. 1387 (M.D. La. 1976) affa 551 F.2d 861 (5th Cir. 1977) (creditor
had relied as much, if not more on the debtor's good "track record" and not on the fraudulent
financial statement, and therefore reliance was not reasonable); In re Smith, 424 F. Supp. 858
(M.D. La. 1976) (creditor's reliance unreasonable). The court rejected the contention that "mere
reliance upon the misrepresentations is the test to apply in determining the dischargeability of the
bankrupt's debt." Id. at 861. In re Adams, 368 F. Supp. 80 (D.S.D. 1973) (lack of reasonableness
in creditor's reliance implicit in court's finding that reliance was unjustified).
92. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. 364 (1977); S. REP. No. 984, 95th Cong., 2d Sess.
77-79 (1978).
93. 700 F.2d 372, 373 (7th Cir. 1983).
94. Id at 373.
95. Id
96. Id at 373-74.




newal was induced by the bank's excellent 15-year loan experience
with the debtor. 00 The bankruptcy court subsequently ruled that its
finding of no reliance was a finding of fact and not of law because the
execution of a financial statement is not an indication that the creditor
relied on the statement when granting the loan. In alleging reliance,
the creditor as plaintiff must make an affirmative showing of such reli-
ance. The court found that ". . .the plaintiff had the burden of proof
in regard to the reliance issue" and that it failed to meet this burden. 0'
The Seventh Circuit then considered two separate issues on ap-
peal: first, whether the bankruptcy court applied the correct legal stan-
dard,10 2 and second, whether the bankruptcy court's fact findings were
clearly erroneous.
0 3
The Seventh Circuit first recongnized that a two-part standard de-
veloped under the Act, and codified into law under the Code, was ap-
plicable in interpreting section 523(a)(2).104 Not only might actual
reliance be proven by circumstantial evidence of reliance,10 5 but the
actual reliance must also be reasonable. 0 6 Mindful of its decision in In
re Garman,0 7 the court reiterated that "this second aspect of the section
17(a)(2) reliance test is not meant as an invitation to second guess a
creditor's decision to make a loan or to set loan policy for the credi-
tor." 0 8 The court also noted that section 17(a)(2) did not permit the
court to "undertake a subjective evaluation and judgment of a credi-
tor's lending policies and practices."109 Garman had made clear that a
creditor need only establish its reliance in fact for the reviewing court
to find that the reliance was reasonable.11
0
In the Kreps appeal, the appellant bank asserted that the bank-
ruptcy court had applied an erroneous legal standard when it construed
this circuit's interpretation of reasonable reliance in Garman."1 The
Seventh Circuit rejected this argument, for it found that the bankruptcy
court had never even considered whether the creditor's reliance had
100. Id..
101. Id. at 375.
102. 700 F.2d at 373.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 375.
105. In re Garman, 625 F.2d 755, 759 (7th Cir. 1980), republished at 643 F.2d 1252 (7th Cir.
1980).
106. In re Matera, 592 F.2d 378, 381 (7th Cir. 1981).
107. See supra note 105.
108. 700 F.2d at 375 (quoting In re Garman, 625 F.2d at 761).
109. 700 F.2d at 376 (citing In re Garman, 625 F.2d at 759).
110. 625 F.2d at 759.
11I. 700 F.2d at 376.
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been reasonable. The lower court had held that a determination of rea-
sonableness had been unnecessary, because it had found that there was
no reliance at all.1 2 Ignoring the Garman court's agreement with prior
case law that reasonableness is simply "circumstantial evidence of ac-
tual reliance,"'1 3 the bankruptcy court had instead established as a
finding of fact that the creditor had not actually relied upon the false
statement when receiving the loan.
The Seventh Circuit found that the bankruptcy court's ruling of
non-reliance was clearly erroneous. The court rejected the bankruptcy
court's reasoning that the creditor, as plaintiff, had failed to sustain its
burden of proving the element of actual reliance. Unquestionably, the
burden of proving each element, including reasonable reliance, lies
with the creditor." 14 However, the Seventh Circuit found that the cred-
itor's increased vigilance in demanding the statement, as well as its sub-
sequent assertion that it would not have granted the renewal request
without the debtor's statement, was sufficient "important circumstantial
evidence of actual reliance."'' 1 5 The Seventh Circuit found, therefore,
that the lower court's findings of fact were erroneous. The court re-
versed and remanded, but concluded that it was unnecessary to litigate
any further on the reasonableness of the bank's reliance.116 The court
followed its reasoning in Garman,' 7 i e., that it was not the responsibil-
ity of the court to determine whether the creditor was reasonable in
relying on the false statement. Rather, the court's responsibility was to
decide whether the creditor had reasonably relied on the statement it-
self. Thus, once the creditor has met his burden of proof in showing
actual reliance, unless there is a showing that it was so unreasonable for
the creditor to rely, a finding of reasonable reliance is almost guaran-
teed. In Kreps, the Seventh Circuit was satisified that the creditor's
burden of proof had been met.
Results of future litigation relating to section 523(a)(2)(B)(iii), at
least within this circuit, are therefore clearly dependent upon the Gar-
112. Id
113. 625 F.2d at 759.
114. 700 F.2d at 376; See also In re Taylor, 514 F.2d 1370, 1373 (9th Cir. 1975).
115. 700 F.2d at 376.
116. Id.
117. 625 F.2d at 759. The Garman court reviewed cases which either stated directly that dis-
chargeability shall not be denied when a creditor's claimed reliance on a financial statement
would be so unreasonable as not to be actual reliance at all, or when the lack of actual reliance
was implicit in the record. See In re Smith, 424 F. Supp. 858 (M.D. La. 1976); In reAdams, 368 F.
Supp. 80 (D.S.D. 1973); Sweet v. Ritter Finance Co., 263 F. Supp. 540 (W.D. Va. 1967); In re
Arden, 2 Bankr. Ct. Dec. 204 (D.R.I. 1975); Cash Finance Service, Inc. v. Haisch, 173 So. 2d 851
(La. App. 1965); In re Ducote, 4 Bankr. Ct. Dec. 943 (W.D. La. 1978).
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man test: reliance will be deemed reasonable when the creditor has
established actual reliance in fact."18 A finding of reasonable reliance
will be disallowed only when the evidence is blatantly inapposite to a
showing of any reliance at all.119
The Seventh Circuit's decision to construe section 523(a)(2)(B) in
the light of Garman is certain to be criticized. While Congress arguably
did not intend to add to the creditor's burden in proving nondis-
chargeability of individual debts, at the same time had it intended that
the creditor's reliance be only reliance in fact, such an intent would
reduce the element of reasonableness to a meaningless appendage of
that section. This could hardly have been the desired result. The better
view would be for the courts, in ascertaining congressional purposes
underlying section 523(a)(2)(B)(iii), to "attempt to strike a balance be-
tween the legitimate competing interests of creditors seeking to estab-
lish exceptions and debtors seeking discharge within the statutory
framework."' 20 In doing so, courts should judge each case upon its
particular set of facts to determine whether the creditor's reliance was
indeed reasonable.
AUTOMATIC STAY-PITTS V UN4RCO INDUSTRIES
The concept of automatic stay, which provides that once a debtor
has filed a petition in bankruptcy, all proceedings in other courts are
"stayed" has traditionally been a concept central to bankruptcy law.
Although stays were granted judicially under earlier law, they were not
statutorily provided for.121 Conversely, the Code has codified the auto-
matic stay concept. 122 The substance of the stay provisions is to stay
pending proceedings, or the filing of new proceedings, during a bank-
ruptcy action.
118. 625 F.2d at 761.
119. Id at 763.
120. In re Patch, 24 Bankr. 563, 567 (D. Md. 1982). The Patch court distinguished Garman
and provided a standard against which the reasonableness of a creditor's reliance on a financial
statement should be judged: The creditor's actual conduct is compared with
(1) the creditor's own normal business practices, and (2) the standard and custom of the
industry, (3) in light of the surrounding circumstances existing at the time the application
was made and credit extended.
Id. at 566-67.
121. Under the Act, there was no comprehensive stay provision. However, there were provi-
sions scattered throughout the act which stayed certain actions against the debtor once a bank-
ruptcy proceeding had been filed. Those provisions were frequently created by the Supreme
Court pursuant to its rulemaking power. See, e.g., BANKR. RULES 401, 601, BANKR. RULE App.
8-501, 9-4, 10-601, 11-44, 12-43 and 13-401.
122. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (1982).
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The Seventh Circuit, in Pitts v. Unarco Industries,123 addressed the
question of whether filing a petition for reorganization under Chapter
11 of the Code stays pending proceedings as to all parties involved, or
only as to the debtor.
Prior to Unarco's filing for reorganization, asbestos litigation was
pending in other courts. Defendants in that litigation were many man-
ufacturers of asbestos, including Unarco. 2 4 Subsequent to judgment
against the defendants, and during the pendency of appeal in that case,
Unarco filed its Chapter 11 petition. That the asbestos litigation was
stayed as to Unarco was undisputed. However, Armstrong World In-
dustries argued that as a co-defendant, the asbestos litigation was
stayed also as to Armstrong during the term of Unarco's reorganiza-
tion. 25 The Seventh Circuit, however, held that section 362(a)(1) of
the Code extended the automatic stay provisions only to the debtor and
to no co-defendants. 2 6 Noting the contrast between the statutory lan-
guage of 362(a)(1) and the automatic stay provisions applicable to
Chapter 13 proceedings, 2 7 the court found crucial the fact that co-
debtors were not mentioned in the stay provisions germane to Chapter
11 proceedings. 128 It virtually adopted the district court's opinion in
Royal Truck & Trailer v. Amadora Martina Salvadorean.
29
123. 698 F.2d 313 (7th Cir. 1983).
124. The entire problem of chapter 11 reorganizations by asbestos manufacturers is beyond
the scope of this article. However, at the time the John-Manville reorganization was filed, 17,000
suits were pending. In fact, lobbyists for Manville Corporation and 12 other asbestos manufactur-
ers have drafted legislation to establish a fund for dispensing awards to asbestos victims. Effron,
Asbestos Firms Draft Bill to End Litigation, Chicago Daily Law Bulletin, Feb. 2, 1984, at 1, col 3.
125. The automatic stay terminates in 30 days unless the debtor attempts to extend it, or upon
the entry of a discharge. In the event of a liquidation, the stay terminates quite quickly. On the
other hand, chapter II reorganization plans frequently span several years and a discharge is not
entered until the completion of the plan. Therefore, the litigation against the asbestos manufac-
turers would remain "in limbo" for some time.
126. "W~e agree with the Royal Truck court's conclusion that the automatic stay provisions of
section 362(a) operate only in favor of the bankrupt debtor..." 698 F.2d at 315.
127. Section 1301 governs stay in chapter 13 proceedings. Subparagraph (a) provides:
(a) Except as provided in subsections (b) and (c) of this section, after the order for
relief under this chapter, a creditor may not act, or commence or continue any civil
action, to collect all or any part of a consumer debt of the debtor from any individual
that is liable on such debt with the debtor, or that secured such debt, unless-
(1) such individual became liable on or secured such debt in the ordinarily
course of such individual's business; or
(2) the case is closed, dismissed, or converted to a case under chapter 7 or 11
of this title.
11 U.S.C. § 1301(a) (1982).
The purpose of including co-debtors in the stay under chapter 13 was to insulate the debtor
from "indirect pressure" from his creditors exerted through friends or relatives that may have
cosigned an obligation of the debtor. Notes of Committee on the Judiciary, H.R. REP. No. 595,
95th Cong., 1st Sess. 121 (1977).
128. 698 F.2d at 314.
129. 10 Bankr. 488 (N.D. Ill. 1981).
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In Royal Truck, the district court relied upon legislative history
and the clear language of the section to summarily determine that the
automatic stay operated only as to the debtor in a Chapter 11 proceed-
ing. Although the reasoning withstands scrutiny, the Seventh Circuit
failed to note that Pitts v. Unarco presented a very different problem
from Royal Truck. Whereas Royal Truck involved breach of lease
claims, 30 Unarco involved products liability actions against many de-
fendants.' 3' Were the litigation allowed simply to proceed to judgment
against the remaining defendants, the burden of any judgment would
be shared by those remaining defendants as joint tortfeasors. 132 Al-
though such a result may be perfectly defensible, it seems that the prob-
lem should at least have been noted. Although Royal Truck may have
been a relatively easy case, Pitts v. Unarco, was not. The facts
presented the Seventh Circuit with an opportunity to effectuate the pol-
icies underlying the Code, and define the relationship between bank-
ruptcy law and all matters which effect a business during
reorganization proceedings. While the Pitts result was correct, the Sev-
enth Circuit apparently, in contrast to their reasoning in other decisions
this term, opted for a mechanical operation of the clearcut rule, rather
than even mentioning the difficulties inherent in the case before it. Al-
though a contrary result would potentially have opened the door for
abusive use of Chapter 11 reorganization, this was entirely ignored by
the Pitts court. Once any defendant had filed a Chapter 11 proceeding,
all other defendants to other litigation could claim the benefits of the
stay provisions, effectively denying or delaying an avenue for relief to a
plaintiff. 3
3
130. In Royal Truck, the plaintiff leased trucks to one of the defendants, Armasal, who subse-
quently filed a petition for reorganization under chapter 11. Uiterwyk, guarantor of the lease and
a general agent of Armasal, sought relief under the automatic stay. The court found that the stay
operated only as to the debtor. Id.
131. The court cited In re Related Asbestos Cases, 23 Bankr. 523 (N.D. Cal. 1982) in which
the district court wrestled with the problem presented by asbestos manufacturers filing for reor-
ganization under chapter 11. The conclusions of the California court were similar to those
reached by the Seventh Circuit. Since the Seventh Circuit decided Pitts v. Unarco, the Sixth
Circuit has reached a similar result in Lynch v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 710 F.2d 1194 (6th
Cir. 1983). That case relied upon the same grounds for decision but explicitly discussed the
problems involved in litigation against many defendants. Cases cited by the Sixth Circuit in
Lynch illustrate that the same result has been reached by a majority of courts.
132. Joint tortfeasors are jointly and severally liable. All may be joined in the same action
although each is liable for a plaintiff's entire damages. See, e.g., Hess v. Gray, 85 F.R.D. 15 (N.D.
Ill. 1979); Tcherepnin v. Franz, 424 F. Supp. 778 (N.D. I11. 1976), gff'a 570 F.2d 187 (7th Cir.),
cert. deniedsub. noma, Alton v. Berke, 439 U.S. 876 (1978).
133. That problem was noted by the Sixth Circuit in Lynch in which the plaintiff's rights and
avenues of redress weighed in the decision.
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FEES
Any fee or administrative expense award in a bankruptcy proceed-
ing must be approved by the bankruptcy court.134 Section 506(c) 13 5 of
the Code provides for the recovery of fees. The Seventh Circuit re-
viewed two fee awards during the 82-83 term, one of which was pursu-
ant to Truth in Lending Laws involved in a bankruptcy proceeding,
1 36
and hence beyond the scope of this article. The award involves recov-
ery of fees by a trustee from a secured creditor and cannot be properly
resolved by the clear language approach which the Seventh Circuit
took. 1
3 7
In re Trim-X 138 involved a Chapter 11 trustee's appeal of a fee
award and recovery of expenses from a secured creditor upon the
trustee's abandonment of property of the estate. Abandonment is gov-
erned by section 554 of the Code 39 which provides that after notice
and hearing, a trustee may abandon any property which is burdensome
or of inconsequential value to the estate. In Trim-X, the debtor owned
assets in which a creditor had perfected security interest. 140 The trustee
employed a security company to protect the assets which were located
in a warehouse, and had those assets appraised. The appraisal indi-
cated that their value was, in fact, less than the amount of the security
interest. On December 20, 1979, the trustee sought, pursuant to section
554, to abandon the assets. On January 21, 1980, the creditor filed a
134. 11 U.S.C. § 503 (1982).
135. Section 506(c) provides:
The trustee may recover from property securing an allowed secured claim the rea-
sonable, necessary costs and expenses of preserving, or disposing of, such property to the
extent of any benefit to the holder of such claim.
11 U.S.C. § 506(c) (1982).
136. In re Pine, 705 F.2d 936 (7th Cir. 1983).
137. In re Trim-X, 695 F.2d 296 (7th Cir. 1983).
138. 695 F.2d 296 (7th Cir. 1983).
139. Section 554 of the Code provides:
(a) After notice and a hearing, the trustee may abandon any property of the estate
that is burdensome to the estate or that is of inconsequential value to the estate.
(b) On request of a party in interest and after notice and a hearing, the court may
order the trustee to abandon any property of the estate that is burdensome to the estate
or that is of inconsequential value to the estate.
(c) Unless the court orders otherwise, any property that is scheduled under section
521(1) of this title and that is not administered before a case is closed under section 350
of this title is deemed abandoned.
(d) Unless the court orders otherwise, property of the estate that is not abandoned
under subsection (a) or (b) of this section and that is not administered in the case re-
mains property of the estate.
11 U.S.C § 554 (1982).
140. The perfection of security interests are matters of state law and are governed by the pro-
visions of Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code. See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 26, §§ 9-101-
9-507 (1981).
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counter-claim. On February 1, 1980, the bankruptcy court ordered the
trustee to abandon the assets. Thereafter, the secured creditor sold
those assets for less than the amount of the secured claim. When the
bankruptcy court held evidentiary hearings on the fee issue, the trustee
claimed that he was entitled to recover the reasonable expenses in-
curred in preserving the assets from the date of his appointment until
the date of the court's order of abandonment. The creditor objected
and the bankruptcy court sharply limited the fees allowed. The district
court affirmed the award as not clearly erroneous, 141 emphasizing the
fact that the creditor's security interest exceeded the value of the collat-
eral. In such a case, it suggested a bankruptcy court's fee award could
never be set aside as too small. 142
The Seventh Circuit held that the relative value of the assets and
the secured claim are not determinative factors in the section 506(c)
analysis however, and emphasized the express terms of the statute.
143
The court noted, but gave no credence to a clearly contrary Senate Re-
port, 144 which stated that fees are recoverable only where the value of
the property exceeds the amount of the security interest. Instead the
court relied upon statements made when amendments to the section
were introduced. 45 Those statements indicated that anytime a trustee
or debtor in possession expended funds to preserve the secured credi-
tor's collateral, all reasonable expenses are recoverable. The court's
sympathies were clearly with the trustee, since the secured creditor had
'caused' the added expenditures. Although the language of the statute
and its legislative history are not entirely clear, the court appears to
have emphasized the "express terms of the statute". 46 The court later
discussed factors 47 which demonstrate that it was properly concerned
with balancing the principle that administrative expenses should be
141. 695 F.2d at 298 (7th Cir. 1982).
142. Id
143. Id.
144. S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 68 (1978).
145. Those statements provided that
[a]ny time the trustee or debtor in possession expends money to provide for the reason-
able and necessary cost and expenses of preserving . . . a secured creditor's collateral,
the trustee or debtor in possession is entitled to recover such expenses from the secured
party or from the property securing an allowed secured claim held by such party.
124 CONG. REC. HI 1089 (Sept. 20, 1978), reprinedin U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 6505, 6520
(statement of Sen. DeConcini).
146. The express terms have been considered by other courts as well. See In re Hotel Associ-
ates, Inc., 6 Bankr. Rep. 108 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1980); Equitable Loan & Sec. Co. v. Moss & Co.,
125 F. 609 (5th Cir. 1903).
147. "[We conclude that the relative values of the assets and the secured claim are not deter-
minative factors in the section 506(c) analysis in this case. Rather, the focus must be on the
express terms of the statute." In re Trim-X, 695 F.2d at 299.
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borne by the general creditors to entitle the secured creditor to the full
value of his security if possible, unimpaired by the bankruptcy liquida-
tions 48 with the policy that even a secured creditor should bear ex-
penses which he caused. The court was properly concerned with
expenses "caused" by the secured creditor for which the trustee re-
quested reimbursement. 49 Thus, the Trim-X opinion properly dis-
cusses the factors which must be considered, but the actual holding
relied upon the "clear language" of the statute. Clearly, policy consid-
erations concerning trustee reimbursement should have been the ar-
ticulated rationale for the holding.
CONCLUSION
Development of substantive case law under the Code continues,
even in the shadow of Marathon.50 During the 82-83 term, the Sev-
enth Circuit carefully avoided carelessly engrafting exceptions to the
Code. Except for its decision in Kreps, the overall emphasis appears to
have focused on construing the clear language of the statute, and, in-
deed the court made those references even in instances where the lan-
guage was, in fact, less than clear. However, the court's decisions on
dischargeability, the very heart of the Code, are clearly open to ques-
tion. Additionally, the court declined to address the difficult policy
questions involved in staying litigation as to co-defendants in asbestos
litigation. Thus, during this past term, the Seventh Circuit rendered
decisions which ranged from dubiously acceptable to solidly defensible.
148. The court first noted that the three elements of proof necessary for recovery under section
506(c) were that the expenses were necessary, benefited the secured creditor, and were reasonable.
Id. The court further noted that, although administrative expenses were not usually charged
against secured creditors, there had traditionally been an exception where expenses were incurred
primarily for the benefit of the secured creditor or where those expenses had been caused by or
consented to by the secured creditor. See4B COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 70.99[6] (14th ed. 1978).
The court seemed particularly persuaded by the fact that the secured creditor had, in failing to
respond promptly to the motion to abandon, caused those expenses. The court relies heavily upon
In re Hotel Assoc., 6 Bankr. 108 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1980), in which the court entered an order
stating prospectively that the chapter I I trustee would be able to recover expenses under 506 (c)
regardless of the worth of the property as related to the amount of the secured claim. Id.
149. See the discussion of "Allocation of Expenses". 4B COLLIER ON BANKRUPTcY 70.99[6]
(14th ed. 1978).
150. Northern Pipeline Construction Company v. Marathon Pipeline Co., 458 U.S. 50, judg-
ment stayed sub. nom U.S. v. Marathon Pipeline Co., 459 U.S. 813 (1982).
